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ABSTRACT: Conscientious objection is an expression of the broader individual right to 
freedom of conscience. Its full protection can not be achieved through strictly legalist 
positions and requires a balancing process between the conflicting legal interests in each 
singular case. The current draft agreements of the Slovak Republic with the Holy See and 
with the other registered churches, aimed at protecting some conscientious objections 
typical of Catholics and of the faithful of other religions, can constitute a useful instrument 
to guarantee effectively the exercise of the right to conscientious objection. Therefore, it 
is surprising the negative opinion delivered by the European Union of Independent 
Experts on Fundamental Rights, apparently more interested in the guarantee of a 
hypothetical fundamental right to abortion or to homosexual marriage than in the actual 
protection of freedom of conscience. 
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Eslovaca, coordinado por Michaela Moravčíková, Directora del Institute for State-Church Relations, 
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Investigación SEJ2005-06642, del Ministerio de Educación. 
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RESUMEN: La objeción de conciencia constituye una manifestación del más amplio 
derecho de la persona a la libertad de conciencia. Su adecuada protección ha de huir de 
actitudes estrictamente legalistas y reclama un proceso de equilibrio de intereses entre 
los bienes jurídicos en conflicto. Los actuales proyectos de acuerdo de Eslovaquia con la 
Santa Sede y con otras confesiones religiosas, encaminados a tutelar algunas 
objeciones de conciencia típicas de católicos y de los fieles de otras religiones, pueden 
suponer un interesante instrumento para la garantía del derecho de objeción. Por eso 
sorprende el juicio negativo que esos proyectos han recibido de la European Union of 
Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, aparentemente más interesados en la 
garantía de un hipotético derecho fundamental al aborto o al matrimonio homosexual que 
en la protección efectiva de la libertad de conciencia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When analyzing the phenomenon of conscientious objections -we use the plural 
intentionally- it is worth remarking that this is not an issue that can be considered only 
‘vaguely juridical’. It is also something very different from a supposed and unreasonable 
‘behavior contra legem’ (against the law) rooted in ethical reasons that are exclusively 
valid for the individual, and therefore without any relevance for society. Conscientious 
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objections are one of the expressions of a human right of larger scope: freedom of 
conscience, which is protected by article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
2 (Ref. Iustel: §0000006), as well as by other international instruments 3 and by most 
European constitutions 4. 
The relationship between conscientious objection and freedom of conscience has 
been affirmed by some constitutional courts 5 and, recently, by some European 
legislations on religious freedom, as in Portugal 6. It has been recognized also by the 
European Charter of Fundamental Right of the European Union -part of the European 
                                              
2 Article 9(1) ECHR provides: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance”. 
3 Among them, in a prominent place, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966). Its art. 18(1-2) provides: “1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, 
and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to 
coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”. 
4 The Spanish Constitution (Ref. Iustel: §0000001) specifically guarantees conscientious objection 
to military service (art. 30 § 2). Freedom of conscience, on the other hand, is included in the 
“freedom of ideology, religion and worship” protected by art. 16, according to reiterated doctrine of 
the Constitutional Court (see R. RODRÍGUEZ CHACÓN, El factor religioso ante el Tribunal 
Constitucional, Madrid 1992, pp. 40-41). 
5 In Spain see, especially, the decision of the Constitutional Court STC 53/1985, 11 April 1985, FJ 
14.º (Ref. Iustel: §100433). The type of objection contemplated in this decision was conscientious 
objection to abortion. 
6 Art. 12 of the Portuguese Law on Religious Freedom (Law n.º 16/2001, 22 June 2001) explicitly 
guarantees the right of conscientious objection, in the following terms: “1. Freedom of conscience 
includes the right to object to the compliance of laws that contradict the imperative commands of 
one’s own conscience, within the limits of the rights and duties imposed by the Constitution and 
under the terms of the law that may regulate the exercise of conscientious objection. 2. The 
commands of conscience that are considered as imperative are those whose infringement involves 
a serious offence to one’s moral integrity and, consequently, make any other behavior as not 
mandatory. 3. Conscientious objectors to military service, without excluding those who also invoke 
a conscientious objection to civil service, have the right to a civil service system, which respects the 
commands of their conscience, as long as it is compatible with the principle of equality”. 
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Constitution (Ref. Iustel: §0060465)-, whose article II-70 guarantees, in close connection, 
“freedom of thought, conscience and religion” and “the right to conscientious objection” 7. 
Conscientious objection is, therefore, a ‘normal’ part of the legal order (a part, besides, 
of singular importance: fundamental rights) and not an exception to the legal order that 
would require an accommodation only when political reasons inexorably request it. 
Elementary as this assertion may seem, it is important to emphasize this departing point 
as a necessary backcloth in a matter that requires complex analysis and that, by its 
characteristics, is not open to simple solutions. This is especially true in the context of 
Western societies, two of whose most visible features are: in the political sphere, an 
interventionist and omnipresent State; and, in the cultural sphere, a post-modernity that 
reveals itself as highly permissive with regard to some ethical patterns and significantly 
rigid with regard to others (without providing always a clear and rational justification for 
that different attitude). This combination of elements is likely to produce areas of conflict 
in societies that tend to be more and more multi-religious 8. 
II. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
1. Notion of conscientious objection 
The determination itself of the concept of conscientious objection is not free from 
problems, as demonstrated by the different positions that can be found in legal literature 
                                              
7 Art. II-70 of the European Charter provides: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. The right to conscientious objection is recognised, in 
accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of this right”. 
8 The exposition that follows is necessarily brief, and bibliographical references have been 
reduced to a minimum (with especial emphasis on Spanish sources, which provide many 
interesting materials that are not always well-known abroad). We have developed our ideas more 
extensively in our forthcoming book R. NAVARRO-VALLS & J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Conflictos entre ley 
y conciencia, Madrid 2006, in which we update and enlarge the views we had expressed in our 
previous books Le obiezioni di coscienza. Profili di diritto comparato, Torino 1995, and Las 
objeciones de conciencia en el derecho español y comparado, Madrid 1997. In different places of 
this essay we will have to refer to some others of our writings which contain broader explanations of 
some ideas mentioned here as well as further bibliographical or documentary references.  
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9. The main reason of those uncertainties among legal scholars is, apparently, the 
difficulty to distinguish this flexible concept from other neighboring, and often ambiguous, 
concepts -for instance, from civil disobedience. It is obvious that not every civil 
disobedience is conscientious objection, but sometimes the efforts to differentiate those 
two concepts seem to pay more attention to the words than to the facts 10. 
In view of the very diverse conflicts that may arise between law and individual 
conscience, the most adequate attitude is, probably, to adopt a broad perspective when 
trying to define the general notion of conscientious objection. It can be understood as the 
individual’s refusal, for reasons of conscience, to accept a behavior that, in principle, could 
be legally required, either by the law directly (legislation, regulations or judicial orders) or by 
a contract endorsed by the law. Thus, conscientious objections would include every conduct 
contrary to the law, motivated by axiological -not merely psychological- reasons, inspired in 
religious or non-religious beliefs, which could be aimed at different purposes: e.g. to elude 
the behavior demanded by the norm or the punishment established for its contravention, or 
even to obtain the modification of the law through the voluntary and passive acceptance of 
the repressive machinery 11. 
It is important, in any event, to realize that this notion of conscientious objection implies 
two characteristics that must influence its legal treatment -at least when trying to regulate this 
                                              
9 Cf. R. BERTOLINO, L´obiezione di coscienza, in the collective volume AA.VV., La objeción de 
conciencia en el ordenamiento español e italiano, Murcia, 1990, p. 41; A. CASTRO JOVER, La libertad 
de conciencia y la objeción de conciencia en la jurisprudencia constitucional española, in “La 
libertad religiosa y de conciencia ante la justicia constitucional” (ed. by J. Martínez-Torrón), 
Granada 1998, 133 ff.; G. ESCOBAR ROCA, La objeción de conciencia en la Constitución española, 
Madrid 1993, pp. 39-44; J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Las objeciones de conciencia y los intereses 
generales del ordenamiento, in “La objeción de conciencia” (ed. by V. Guitarte y J. Escrivá), 
Valencia 1993, pp. 257 ff.; L. PRIETO SANCHÍS, La objeción de conciencia, in I.C. IBÁN-L. PRIETO 
SANCHÍS-A. MOTILLA, Curso de Derecho eclesiástico, Madrid 1991, p. 344; M.J. ROCA, Perfiles 
jurídicos de la objeción de conciencia, in the collective volume “La objeción de conciencia”, cit. 
supra in this same note, pp. 273-282; J. SOUSA DE BRITO, Conscientious Objection, in the collective 
volume “Facilitating Freedom of Religion and Belief: A Deskbook” (ed. by T. Lindholm, C. Durham & 
B. Tahzib-Lie), Leiden 2004, pp. 273 ff. 
10 On the relations between conscientious objection and civil disobedience, see L. PRIETO 
SANCHÍS, La objeción de conciencia como forma de desobediencia al derecho, in “Il diritto 
ecclesiastico” I (1984), pp. 3-34. 
11 See R. NAVARRO-VALLS Y J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Las objeciones de conciencia …, cit. supra, in 
note n. 8 pp. 14-15. 
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social phenomenon from the perspective of the maximum possible degree of protection of 
human rights. 
The first one is the fact that the objector finds himself in front of a serious internal conflict 
12; he has to yield either to the legal norm of the State or to the ethical norm that is invoked 
by his own individual conscience and that is vested as a supreme law. The immediate 
consequence is that there is a heavy moral burden on those persons, who are destined to 
choose between either disobeying the secular law or disobeying their supreme ethical rules. 
The former alternative entails a material punishment; the latter, a moral sanction. This is the 
reason why some scholars have affirmed that true conscientious objectors must be prepared 
to submit to the penalties established by the law it they are not afforded the requested 
exemption from legal duties 13. In our opinion, this is perhaps too radical an statement, for it 
would mean, in practice, that every conscientious objector would have to be a sort of ‘social 
hero’; and to require that attitude from citizens is not probably the best policy for the 
promotion of fundamental rights. 
The second characteristic is the enormous possible variety of conscientious objections. In 
other words, its permanent unpredictability, which increases in proportion to society’s 
religious and ideological pluralism 14; and also in proportion to the constant legislator’s 
intervention in new areas 15. This characteristic is a consequence of the fact that 
                                              
12 See J.M. MARTÍ SÁNCHEZ, La objeción de conciencia: visión de conjunto, in “Anuario de 
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado” 15 (1999), pp. 41-44. This aspect of conscientious objection has 
been well understood by the art. 12(2) of the Portuguese Law on Religious Freedom, cited supra, in 
note n. 6.  
13 See K. GREENAWALT, Conflicts of Law and Morality, New York 1987, p. 313. 
14 Among European legal literature, the broad panorama of possible conscientious objections that 
can be found in a country with a high religious pluralism, as the United States, has been well 
described and analyzed by R. PALOMINO, Las objeciones de conciencia. Conflictos entre conciencia y 
ley en el derecho norteamericano, Madrid 1994. 
15 To cite some recent examples that have attracted the attention of public opinion in Spain: 
problems of conscientious objection to participate in a jury only arise when a law imposes the 
peremptory obligation to accept the aleatory appointment as jury, as occurs in Spain since the 1995 
Law of the Jury; moral opposition to certain types of bio-genetic experimentation acquires legal 
relevance when some scientific or technical practices are regulated by law and incorporated to the 
public health’s sphere, with possible discriminatory consequences for conscientious objectors. The 
subject has been also widely discussed in Spanish public opinion when some judges or mayors 
expressed their conscientious objection to celebrate homosexual marriages, legalized in Spain in 
July 2005.  
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conscientious objection, although sometimes rooted in institutional religious beliefs, is 
essentially an individual phenomenon. The conscience of each person, affirming its 
individual autonomy, is the factor that may generate a conflict with a concrete legal 
obligation. This explains the difficulties to regulate conscientious objections exclusively 
through legislation, which would be efficient only with regard to the cases of objection that 
have extensively spread in society. And this explains also that the legal treatment of the 
problems derived from conscientious objection must be achieved through a prevalent resort 
to the judiciary. With or without legislative regulation of conscientious objection -even more in 
the latter case- only the courts can ultimately perform the individualized analysis that cases 
of conscientious objection demand. 
2. Two basic approaches 
Even at the risk of simplifying such a complex issue, we can affirm that there are two 
basic perspectives to understand the way the legal treatment of conscientious objection 
should be achieved. One is legalism and the other is the balance of interests. 
The legalist perspective, frequent in the civil law tradition, departs from a double basis: 
the legislator is always right, and the legal system can be ultimately reduced to legislation. 
To say it in the words of an Italian jurist, its central axiom is that “legislation is all the law and 
all legislation is law” 16. From that angle, every conflict between conscience and law -
understood as statutory law- must be resolved always in favor of the latter. Any other 
solution -it is said- would imply a risk for legal security, a danger of ‘pulverization’ of the legal 
order, for general rules would be at the expense of each individual conscience’s choices -
choices that are unpredictable and not necessarily reasonable. Freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is interpreted in a restrictive way, as protecting only against those 
laws specifically aimed at obstructing some particular religion or belief (or religion in general, 
although this is less likely in the European Union context). Thus, exemptions from the 
obligations imposed by a ‘neutral’ law -i.e. a law that pursues legitimate secular goals- could 
be granted only by the law itself. In other words, conscientious objection to a legal mandate 
could be alleged legitimately and successfully only when there is interpositio legislatoris, that 
is, when it has been explicitly accepted by the legislator. 
In contrast, the approach of the balance of interests proceeds originally -and probably this 
is not just coincidental- from a conception of the law free from the prejudices of legal 
                                              
16 The original Italian wording, much more expressive, is “la legge è tutto il diritto e la legge è tutta 
diritto”. The expression is from L. LOMBARDI VALLAURI, and is quoted by F. D´AGOSTINO, Accoglienza 
alla vita in una epoca di secolarizzazione, in the collective volume Diritto e secolarizzatione, Milano 
1982, p. 44. 
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positivism; in particular, from a judge-made law as North-American law 17. Its center of 
gravity is not the intangibility of statutory law but the search for the maximum possible 
degree of protection for freedom of religion, thought and conscience. Hence conscientious 
objection is not deemed as a tolerated exception to the general rule that -according to the 
positivist mythology- would absorb in itself the entire content of justice. On the contrary, as 
freedom of conscience is a constitutional value in itself, and therefore a rule, not an 
exception to a rule, it demands “a physiologic, and not a traumatic, recognition of 
conscientious objection” 18. Conscience-based objection, accordingly, is not observed with 
diffidence, as an evasive attitude towards the legal system, but is analyzed, in the light of 
its conflict with other legal interests represented by the objected law, as the result of an 
attitude that “endeavors to affirm great ideals in ‘minor’ situations” 19. 
Our position is, naturally, favorable to the balance of interests’ approach, among other 
reasons because it is founded upon a much more precise -more realistic- analysis of facts. 
In effect, legalism is based, consciously or not, on a certain distortion of reality. 
First, the laws usually called ‘neutral’ are not as neutral as they appear at first glance. It is 
true that they are neutral to the extent that they pursue a legitimate secular goal. But we 
must bear in mind that every law has an ethical foundation, more or less visible, and more or 
less direct, depending on the cases; after all, the law is but a series of instruments through 
which a society endeavors to organize itself around diverse values that are essentially 
ethical -and of course pre-juridical 20. Normally, the ethical foundation of a norm corresponds 
to some values that are accepted by the largest part of a given society. As a consequence, 
that norm will not usually collide with the conscience of the majority of population, which in 
turn has been molded by the most influential religious or ideological ideas present in that 
society. But it is not surprising that the same norm causes some conflicts with the 
conscience of people maintaining minority religious or ideological options. In other words, 
neutral laws are aimed at realizing -and preserving- ethical values that are socially 
                                              
17 See, among European literature, J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Separatismo y cooperación en la 
experiencia jurídica norteamericana, in “Los acuerdos del Estado español con las confesiones 
religiosas minoritarias”, Madrid 1995, especially pp. 111 ff.; R. PALOMINO, Las objeciones de 
conciencia, cit. in note n. 14, especially pp. 28 ff.; J.I. RUBIO LÓPEZ, La primera de las libertades. La 
libertad religiosa en EE.UU. durante la corte Rehnquist (1986-2005): una libertad en tensión, 
Pamplona 2006, especially pp. 246-273. 
18 R. BERTOLINO, L'obiezione di coscienza ‘moderna’. Per una fondazione costituzionale del diritto di 
obiezione, Torino 1994, p. 93. 
19 Ibid., p. 35. 
20 See J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Religión, derecho y sociedad, Granada 1999, pp. 225 ff. 
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recognized as civic values and that often have a religious origin. To discard a priori, without 
further consideration, the possibility to argue conscientious objection against neutral norms 
implies, de facto, a potential discrimination against religious minorities that do not share the 
underlying values 21. 
In the second place, the idea of the automatic prevalence of neutral laws over freedom of 
conscience is based upon an inaccurate analysis of the juridical interests that are in the 
balance. In brief, legalist analysis can be described according to the following sequence: free 
conscience is naturally a legitimate interest, but it is an individual or private interest, and 
therefore it must yield in front of the public interest represented by the law. This analysis is 
mistaken. First, freedom to live according to one’s conscience is not merely an individual or 
private interest. From the State’s perspective, as freedom of conscience is a fundamental 
right, its protection is a public interest of the highest rank. This applies to all cases, 
independently from the actual social relevance -great or minor- of a certain expression of the 
exercise of freedom of conscience. On the other hand, in cases of conscientious objection 
what it is really at stake is not the public interest represented by a law, for normally the 
objector does not seek the derogation of that law but only to be exempted from it 22. The 
actual public interest in conflict with freedom of conscience is rather the interest in 
maintaining the application of a norm in the hundred per cent of cases, without any 
exception whatsoever. 
From this angle, the analysis of conflicts between law and conscience is completely 
different from the one performed by the legalist approach previously described. We do not 
face a situation of private interest versus public interest, but rather two public interests in 
confrontation; and one of them is of the maximum category, for it is rooted in the exercise of 
a constitutional right, which is universally included in the international documents for the 
protection of human rights. We must still add that, in principle, the guarantee that the legal 
system provides for freedom of conscience does not discriminates between the diverse 
particular ethical values that inspire each individual conscience, for the same reason that the 
State does not make the protection of freedom of expression depend on which are the ideas 
expressed by each citizen. These fundamental rights are not aimed at defending some 
particular beliefs or opinions but at safeguarding certain spheres of autonomy for the 
                                              
21 See A. OLLERO TASSARA, Derechos humanos y metodología jurídica, Madrid 1989, p. 199. 
22 See F. ONIDA, Contributo a un inquadramento giuridico del fenomeno delle obiezioni di coscienza, 
in “Il diritto ecclesiastico” (1982), p. 229. 
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individual -and sometimes also for groups- which constitute necessary elements of 
democratic pluralism, and in which any interference must be carefully justified 23. 
In the third place, to affirm that the system of balance of interests entails a danger of 
‘pulverization’ of the legal order is, in the best of cases, a clear overstatement. We are not 
defending an automatic predominance of conscientious objection in opposition to the 
automatic predominance of neutral laws. As all fundamental rights, the exercise of freedom 
of conscience is subject to limitations, which, in the European countries are enumerated in 
article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights 24. The important thing is to 
analyze precisely the juridical interests in conflict to determine, ad casum, which of them 
must prevail. No matter how neutral a legal rule appears prima facie, its imposition against 
the dictates of free conscience is a restriction of a fundamental right. And, according to 
article 9(2) of the European Convention, the only legitimate restrictions to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion are those which, being “prescribed by law”, can be 
considered “necessary in a democratic society”. That is, those measures which, according to 
the case-law of the Strasbourg Court, respond to a “pressing social need” 25. 
For this reason, in the end, the balance of interests approach seeks to compel the State 
to clearly justify that the application of a legal rule without any fissures at all is strictly 
necessary, and that it is also necessary to deny any exemption to the people who, in 
                                              
23 See, in this regard, the European Court of Human Right’s decision Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 
May 1993, § 31. 
24 Article 9(2) ECHR provides: “Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”. On the question of limitation on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, see 
the essays of different authors -from Europe and United States- collected in the monographic issue of 
Emory International Law Review 19 (2005). 
25 This doctrine has been reiterated by the European Court of Human Rights in numerous 
decisions since Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 December 1976 (see especially § 49). With 
specific reference to religious freedom, see Kokkinakisv. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 47. For further 
details on this subject, see J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, in “Emory International Law Review” 19 (2005), pp. 587-
636. For a comment on the significant Kokkinakis decision, see J. GUNN, Adjudicating Rights of 
Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in “Religious Human Rights in 
Global Perspective” (ed. by J.D. van der Vyver & J. Witte), Boston 1996, pp. 305-330. 
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exercise of their freedom of conscience, allege serious moral scruples to abide by that rule 
26. 
It is important to add that, in the balancing process that must characterize the analysis of 
cases of conscientious objection, judges must avoid too simple solutions in terms of a mere 
response of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the objectors’ claims. Sometimes, the crucial point consists in 
interpreting a legal rule in a way that permits the maximum possible adaptation to the moral 
duties alleged by objectors. This idea has been well understood by Canadian courts 27, in 
turn inspired by some U.S. Supreme Court decisions between the early 1960s and 1990 28. 
This judicial doctrine maintains that, in the balancing process, we must counterweight the 
two juridical interests in confrontation -protection of freedom of conscience versus the 
interest in keeping the application of a legal rule without any exception- taking into account 
two essential elements 29. On the one hand, the State is obliged to seek an accommodation 
of the rule to the citizens’ duties of conscience, except when it would cause an ‘undue 
hardship’ for other citizens or institutions. On the other hand, when freedom of conscience 
must yield to other legal interests, the State is required to apply the law in the way that is 
                                              
26 This was indeed the purpose of a federal law passed in the United States in 1993, under 
Clinton’s presidency, later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as contrary to the 
“establishment clause” of the Constitution (see, among the Spanish liteature, I. BRIONES, La 
conciencia religiosa en la Religious Freedom Restoration Act de 1993 y la jurisprudencia 
norteamericana, in “La libertad religiosa y de conciencia ante la justicia constitucional”, cit. in note 
n. 9, pp. 385 ff.). Unfortunately, the doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights, perhaps afraid 
of opening an unpredictable Pandora’s box, has not always been clear on these issues. The most 
significant cases are Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 December 1976, 
Efstratiou v. Greece, 18 December 1996, and Valsamis v. Greece, 18 December 1996 (the text of 
the two latter decisions is almost identical, as almost identical were the facts of both cases). See J. 
MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN & R. NAVARRO-VALLS, The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the 
Council of Europe, in the collective volume “Facilitating Freedom of Religion and Belief…, cited in 
note n. 9, pp. 230-236. 
27 Among Spanish bibliography, see the essays by E. RELAÑO PASTOR, Multiculturalismo y libertad 
religiosa en Canadá, in “Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado” 15 (2000) pp. 63-86; and El 
pluralismo religioso: el modelo canadiense, in “Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho 
Eclesiástico del Estado” 1 (2003), pp. 1-73 (www.iustel.com). We must note that the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms not only guarantees freedom of conscience and religion, but also 
recognizes multiculturalism as an integral part of Canadian social identity (cf. arts. 2(a) and 27 of 
the Charter).  
28 See infra, note n. 32. 
29 Vid. R. PALOMINO, Las objeciones de conciencia…, cit. en nota n. 14, pp. 40-44. 
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least harmful for the objector’s conscience -this has led to the judicial doctrines of the ‘least 
restrictive means’ in USA, and of ‘minimal impairment’ in Canada 30. 
We could still add a fourth reason of legislative policy against strictly legalist positions in 
this matter. Undoubtedly, conscientious objectors refuse to abide by certain legal provisions, 
but normally they are persons of high moral standards, a characteristic that is a requirement 
to be a good citizen. This high concept of morals is precisely the cause of their scruples of 
conscience and the origin of their personal drama. They find it impossible, in a particular 
case, to harmonize their double loyalty -to their conscience and to society- and endeavor to 
obtain the exemption of a legal obligation that makes possible to keep that harmony. 
Conscientious objectors are usually good citizens, and want to continue to be deemed as 
such. To apply the legal rule with all rigor to them without a powerful reason is not, probably, 
the best policy. 
3. Conscientious objection and State neutrality 
The type of analysis that we defend here is based upon the notion that the rule of law is 
at the same time the rule of rights 31, with the consequence that public authorities are bound 
to facilitate a reasonable accommodation to citizens’ duties of conscience, as far as this 
does not impair a predominant public interest 32. Naturally, the State’s responsibility of 
                                              
30 A recent application of this doctrine by the Supreme Court of Canada can be seen in the 
decision Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, J.E. 2006-508. The 
English and French versions of the decision, commented by S. CAÑAMARES, can be found in 
“Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado” 11 (2006) – 
www.iustel.com. 
31 The expression is from R. BERTOLINO, L’obiezione di coscienza ‘moderna’, cit. supra, note n. 18, 
p. 77. The original Italian wording is much more expressive: a stato di diritto is also a stato di diritti.  
32 This position gained momentum in the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court especially since the 
case Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), related to conscientious objection to work on 
Saturdays (in the Spanish literature, an analysis of the case can be found in J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, 
Las objeciones de conciencia en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo norteamericano, in 
“Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado” 1 (1985), pp. 436 ff., R. PALOMINO, Objeción de 
conciencia y relaciones laborales en el Derecho de los Estados Unidos, in “Revista Española de 
Derecho del Trabajo” 50 (1991), p. 908). Since 1990, with the case Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court began to revise its own doctrine, which has since then 
experienced an irregular evolution (for some comments on the transcendental Smith decision, from 
different perspectives, see M.W. MCCONNELL, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, en 
“University of Chicago Law Review” 57 (1990), pp.1109 ff.; D. LAYCOCK, The Remnants of Free 
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accommodation does not depend on the ‘reasonability’ of a certain objection in the context of 
a given society, nor does it depend either on the sympathy, or fear, that some choices of 
conscience may provoke in public opinion. It is worth stressing it, for sometimes the study of 
the questions raised by freedom of conscience is carried out from an emotional rather than 
from a juridical perspective, with an excessive emphasis on the affinity, or lack of affinity, that 
the observer may have with the objector’s position. Even, sometimes, what should be a 
strictly legal analysis ends up metamorphosing into an ideological or political battlefield. 
Thus, we may find the paradox that the same people who passionately defend objection to 
military service or to pay the taxes corresponding to military expenses reject, with analogous 
fierceness, the right of objection to abortion, euthanasia or certain activities of biogenetic 
experimentation. 
In our opinion, the legal analysis of each case of conscientious objection, according to a 
balancing process of the interests in conflict, must be performed independently from the 
specific content of the beliefs invoked by the objector -i.e. independently from whether these 
beliefs are ‘reasonable’ or not, typical or atypical, strictly individual or endorsed by the 
institutional tenets of a church. This ‘aseptic’ analysis is required by the ethical neutrality of 
the State, which entails refraining from any judgment on what is morally correct, except in 
those questions relating to the ethical principles that found the legal order, especially the 
constitutional order. This ‘ethical relativism’ of the State, essential to the maintenance of 
pluralism, has been affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights: “but for very 
exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention 
excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or 
                                                                                                                            
Exercise, en “Supreme Court Review” (1990), pp.1 ff.; W.P. MARSHALL, In Defense of Smith and Free 
Exercise Revisionism, en “The University of Chicago Law Review” 58 (1991), pp.308 ff.; M.A, GLENDON 
& R.F. YANES, Structural Free Exercise, cit., p.532; in Europe, see F. ONIDA, La libertà religiosa nella 
giurisprudenza della Suprema Corte americana dell’ultimo decennio, en “Il Diritto Ecclesiastico” (1993), 
pp.313 ff.). After Smith, a federal law (Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993), voted in Congress 
by a large and unusual majority, attempted to reinstate the previous state of things, but a 
substantial part of it was promptly declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the case City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). This was not, however, the end of the legislative 
initiatives at the federal level to guarantee religious freedom against possible interferences by 
public authorities, as demonstrated by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
passed in 2000. See in this respect J.I. RUBIO LÓPEZ, La nueva protección de la libertad religiosa en 
Estados Unidos: la “Religious Land use and Institutionalized Persons Act” (RLUIPA) del 2000, in 
“Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado” 10 (2006) – 
www.iustel.com. 
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the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate” 33. This sentence reiterates, in a 
different wording, what the United States Supreme Court had expressed, more broadly, 
almost sixty years before: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that 
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein” 34. 
Similar reasons explain that protection of freedom of conscience must be the same when 
the objector’s beliefs are religious and when they are not. It is universally recognized that 
freedom of conscience is a primarily individual right 35 that comprises positively religious 
attitudes as well as those inspired in atheistic or agnostic ideas 36. The fact that a particular 
conscientious objection is endorsed by an institutional religious doctrine does not confer by 
                                              
33 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, § 78. The case was related to the State 
intervention in some disputes between Islamic communities for the election of their religious 
leaders.  
34 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). This case was 
related to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ conscientious objection to participate in the flag salute ceremony in 
public schools. For further details, see J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Las objeciones de conciencia…, cit. in 
note n. 32, pp. 429-435. 
35 Sometimes, however, it is possible to speak of ‘institutional conscientious objection’. The most 
frequent cases relate to the opposition of Catholic hospitals to the practice of voluntary abortions 
when these are decriminalized. See R. NAVARRO-VALLS, La objeción de conciencia al aborto: 
derecho comparado y derecho español, in “Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado” 2 (1986), 
pp 284-285 and 289. 
36 See, in more detail, J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, La protección internacional de la libertad religiosa, in 
the collective treatise “Tratado de Derecho Eclesiástico”, Pamplona 1994, pp. 186-193. The 
Committee of Human Rights’ General Comment on freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(art. 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) clearly indicates in its § 2: “Article 
18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion 
or belief. The terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ are to be broadly construed”. (General Comment No. 22: 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18): 30/07/93; 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General Comment No. 22). Similar affirmations can be found in the case 
law of the Strasbourg Court. For instance, when, in the case Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 
31, affirms: “freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic 
society’ within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital 
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a 
precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it”. 
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itself an extra protection with regard to atheistic or agnostic objectors -although it can be 
taken into account as an element of evidence to prove the sincerity of the objector (i.e. to 
prove that conscientious objection is not alleged fraudulently with the mere intention to elude 
a legal duty). 
4. Utility and limits of legislative regulation of conscientious objection 
From our previous affirmations we can infer that, from the perspective of balance of 
interests, an explicit legislative recognition of each type of conscientious objection is not 
necessary, strictly speaking, for their juridical protection. As conscientious objections are 
an expression of the right to freedom of conscience, enshrined by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and usually also by national constitutions in European 
countries, the interpositio legislatoris is not indispensable and the courts are entitled to 
provide for the adequate protection of singular cases of objection 37. 
However, if the possibility -and the necessity- of judicial protection of conscientious 
objections is patent, it is also indubitable the utility of their legislative regulation in a large 
part of the European continent, still permeated by a tradition of legalist positivism. This 
seems especially true if we consider that, in many European countries, a remarkable part 
of the courts are reluctant, in practice, to apply directly the rules of the Constitution or of 
the European Convention on Human Rights when deciding cases concerning 
fundamental freedoms that are not specifically regulated by statutory law. A specific 
legislative endorsement would grant many judges a ‘sense of security’ that they are 
unable to find either in their respective constitutions or in the European Convention. Thus, 
the legal status of conscientious objectors would certainly be more guaranteed through 
                                              
37 In Spain this idea was clearly expressed by the Constitutional Court when it decided on a 
motion of unconstitutionality against a draft law decriminalizing some types of voluntary abortions. 
The Court affirmed that the fact that the law did not include a specific clause to guarantee the rights 
of conscientious objection to abortion -as was usual in other European legislations- did not make 
the law unconstitutional, for “the right to conscientious objection … exists and can be exercised 
independently from the fact that this legal clause has been included or not. Conscientious objection 
forms part of the content of the fundamental right to freedom of ideology and religion recognized in 
article 16(1) of the Constitution; and, as this Court has repeatedly remarked, the Constitution can 
be directly applied [by the courts], especially in the area of fundamental rights” (Constitutional 
Court, STC 53/1985, 11 April 1985, FJ 14). On the case law of the Constitutional Court in this area, 
see, among the abundant Spanish literature, A. CASTRO JOVER, La libertad de conciencia y la 
objeción de conciencia…, cit. in note n. 9. 
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an explicit recognition by the legislator, which would correct the negative effects of a 
possible legalist attitude on the part of some courts. 
We must not forget, in any event, that judges’ responsibility in this area can not be 
substituted by legislation, which has its limits. First, legislation is appropriate to regulate 
only those types of conscientious objection that have reached a certain social spreading, 
but the rest of cases will have to be solved by the courts according to the general rules on 
fundamental freedoms. Second, the legislator tends to ‘be late’ -until a particular type of 
objection gets to be regulated by statutory law, many conflicts have already arrived to the 
courts, which must provide a just solution. Not rarely judicial experience is precisely the 
factor that persuades the legislator of the necessity of a statute and delineates its basic 
principles. In addition, even when a type of objection has already been the object of a 
specific legislation, the individualized analysis of each singular case continues to be 
necessary, as demonstrated by the abundant litigation on, e.g., objection to military 
service, abortion, jury, etc. 38. Also in this area it is true the old idea -so well-known and 
so often forgotten- that statutes can not foresee all the particular circumstances of every 
case. 
The issue of legislative recognition of objections leads us to consider a significant 
question: up to what extent a law that accepts a particular conscientious objection as 
legitimate must establish at the same time a substitutive service or activity. In our opinion, 
substitutive service is not, as such, essential to the legal acceptance of conscientious 
objection. This is something that belongs to the logic of fundamental rights, which can not 
place an extra legal burden on the citizens who choose to exercise them in a certain 
direction. Substitutive service makes sense when it is necessary to guarantee two 
objectives that are often in close relationship: the protection of the principle of equality 
and the prevention of legal fraud. That is, when it is imposed to objectors in order to make 
their juridical position equal to that of the rest of the citizens, or in order to dissuade 
potential pseudo-objectors from alleging inexistent scruples of conscience to get rid of a 
legal obligation. Thus, substitutive service may be efficient with regard to conscientious 
objection to military service or to the payment of social security fees 39; but it seems 
                                              
38 See, in this regard the corresponding chapters of the books mentioned in note n. 8. See also 
the chapters on conscientious objections (chapters 7.9.1 through 7.9.9) in the collective textbook 
Manual de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado (on line), available in www.iustel.com.  
39 In the Netherlands, for instance, conscientious objectors to pay social security fees, such as 
members of some churches of Mennonite origin, can benefit from a legal exemption, but must pay 
an equivalent amount as an extra income tax, to prevent legal fraud by pseudo-objectors. See R. 
NAVARRO-VALLS & J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Las objeciones de conciencia…, cit. in note n. 11, pp. 229-
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inappropriate when objectors do not obtain a privileged legal position with regard to non-
objectors, as occurs in objection to abortion 40, or in cases of legal duties imposed in an 
aleatory manner, as participation in a jury or in electoral commissions 41. 
III. THE DRAFT TREATIES BETWEEN THE SLOVAK STATE AN RELIGIOUS 
DENOMINATIONS ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
The ideas expressed in the previous pages permit us to provide a brief opinion on the 
draft agreements between the Slovak State and religious denominations 42. The starting 
point of these initiatives is article 7 of the 2000 Basic Agreement between the Slovak 
Republic and the Holy See, which recognizes the right of conscientious objection 
according to the principles of the Catholic Church and remits its detailed regulation to a 
further specific agreement 43. This article generated a draft agreement between Slovakia 
and the Holy See, which has experienced diverse modifications in the last months and 
which gave origin to a twin agreement between the Slovak State and the other registered 
                                                                                                                            
230. Cf. also the information available at: http://www.european-
voice.com/downloads/NL_New_Health_Insurance_System.pdf. 
40 See R. NAVARRO-VALLS, La objeción de conciencia al aborto, cit. in note n. 35, especially pp. 
266-269. 
41 In Spain, for instance, participation in a jury is compulsory when a persona has been selected 
by draw and does not have a legal excuse or incompatibility; this has created some problems with 
Catholic clergymen and members of religious orders and with Jehovah’s Witnesses -for very 
different reasons en each of these cases. On the other hand, the law regulating elections in Spain 
impose a strict duty to participate in the electoral commissions controlling voting in elections day 
when a persona has been selected by draw and is not excused by the corresponding electoral 
board of his area; refusal to comply with this duty is punished as “electoral crime”. See J. MARTÍNEZ-
TORRÓN, Ley del jurado y objeción de conciencia, in “Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional” 
48 (1996), pp. 119-143. 
42 The text of these agreements, together with a brief and interesting historical explanation by 
Michaela Moravcikova, can be found in: http://eurel.u-strasbg.fr/ (under the headings Slovakia –
current debates– April 2006). 
43 Article 7 of the Basic Agreement provides: “The Slovak Republic recognizes to everybody the 
right of conscientious objection according to the moral and doctrinal principles of the Catholic 
Church. The extent and conditions for the application of this right will be defined in a specific 
agreement between the two High Parties” (authors’ translation). 
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churches and religious communities 44 -aimed, reasonably, at granting a similar legal 
status in this area to all registered churches. 
1. A novelty that is not so new 
These two draft agreements constitute a novelty in comparative law as far as they 
would be the only specific agreements between State and religious denominations with 
the exclusive purpose of guaranteeing the right of conscientious objection according to 
some institutional religious doctrines. However, the idea of providing specific protection to 
religious conscientious objection in the State legislation, or in the context of broader 
agreements between State and religions, is not completely new. On the contrary, there 
are some significant precedents in comparative law. 
We can mention, for instance, some examples in Spanish law. The 1976 Agreement 
between the Spanish State and the Holy See recognizes the conscientious objection of 
Catholic priests in a particular case: the right to keep silence, even if asked in a criminal 
trial, on the communications they have heard in the sacrament of confession 45 -i.e. the 
so-called clergy-communicant privilege in the common law systems, which has an 
ancient history in the Occident 46. Similar provisions can be found, with regard to their 
religious leaders, in the three agreements signed in 1992 by the Spanish State and, 
respectively, the Protestant, Jewish and Islamic federations 47. These same 1992 
                                              
44 In total, ten different Christian churches and the union of Jewish communities. The text of this 
draft is almost identical to the one of the draft agreement with the Catholic Church, with the natural 
adaptations. 
45 See Agreement between the Holy See and the Spanish State, 28 July 1976, art. II(3.º). 
46 For a rigorous and interesting analysis of this subject in Spanish and comparative law, see R. 
PALOMINO, Derecho a la intimidad y religión. La protección jurídica del secreto religioso, Granada 
1999. 
47 See article 3(2) of the agreements of 10 November 1992 between the Spanish State and the 
Evangelical Federation (FEREDE), the Jewish Federation (FCI) and the Islamic Federation (CIE). 
This rule, with reference to all religious ministers, was already contemplated since the 19th century 
in the Spanish law on criminal procedure (cf. art. 417 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal). On the 
cooperation agreements of the Spanish State with Protestants, Jews and Muslims, see generally J. 
OTADUY, Los Proyectos de acuerdo de cooperación con las Iglesias evangélicas y las comunidades 
israelitas, in “Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica” (1991-1992/2), pp. 138 ff.; J. MARTÍNEZ-
TORRÓN, Separatismo y cooperación en los acuerdos del Estado con las minorías religiosas, 
Granada 1994; J. MANTECÓN, Los acuerdos del Estado con las confesiones acatólicas, Jaén 1995; 
the collective volume Acuerdos del Estado español con confesiones religiosas minoritarias (ed. by 
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agreements contain some provisions related to conscientious objections in connection 
with religious duties of sabbatical rest (in the area of labor contracts, students’ 
examinations at public schools and public examinations for the selection of civil servants), 
and also in connection with religious dietary prescriptions of people confined in military, 
penitentiary or educational centers. We could even mention that these agreements were 
criticized by scholars because of the scarce protection they provided to these types of 
conscientious objection, when we compare it with the equivalent provisions, e.g., of the 
Italian intese between State and religious denominations 48. 
Thus, the draft agreements of the Slovak state on issues related to conscientious 
objection follow the path of other precedents in Western comparative law and constitute a 
step forward in the same direction, namely the guarantee of a certain expression of 
freedom of conscience. From this perspective, it is natural that the first impression they 
generate has to be a positive one. Therefore, we could not help our perplexity when 
reading the Opinion n.º 4-2005 (14 December 2005) written by the European Union 
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights on the draft agreement with the 
Holy See 49. The reason is that this text, since the beginning, emphasizes the possible 
problems that this agreement could create for the protection of other alleged fundamental 
rights while ignoring the possible benefits that it could produce for the guarantee of 
freedom of conscience, which is its primary objective. 
                                                                                                                            
V. Reina & M.A. Félix), Madrid 1996; D. GARCÍA-PARDO, El sistema de acuerdos con las 
confesiones minoritarias en España e Italia, Madrid 1999; and the collective volume Los Acuerdos 
con las confesiones minoritarias. Diez años de vigencia, Madrid 2003. 
48 See J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Diez años después. Sugerencias sobre una posible revisión de los 
Acuerdos de 1992 con las Federaciones evangélica, israelita e islámica, in the collective volume 
“Los Acuerdos con las confesiones minoritarias…”, cited in the previous note, pp. 120-131; J. 
MANTECÓN, Los acuerdos del Estado con las confesiones acatólicas (1995), pp. 65-69. Article 3 of 
the intesa (agreement) of the Italian State with the Union of Hebraic Communities in Italy (1989, 
modified in 1996), recognizes the right to observe the sabbatical rest to the Jews working in the 
public or in the private sector. A similar provision is contained in article 17 of the intesa with the 
Union of Seventh-Day Adventist Churches (1988, modified in 1996). Article 6 of the intesa with the 
Hebraic Communities guarantees to the Jews in the military, in hospitals or in penitentiaries the 
right to observe their religious dietary rules.  
49 We will comment briefly on this opinion in the next section of this paper. Its text can be found in 
the source mentioned in note n. 49; also in the official web pages of the Network: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/index_fr.htm.  
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2. The draft agreements deserve a positive judgment 
This positive first impression that the drafts deserve is reinforced by two factors. 
One of them is the drafts’ basic approach, as materialized in article 2 of the text. Its 
purpose is not to oppose to any other fundamental right, but merely to protect freedom of 
conscience -which is a fundamental right of utmost importance- in connection with other 
universal human values, such as human life and dignity, family or marriage. In this 
respect, it is difficult to find anything objectionable in the drafts’ approach, especially 
when we consider that articles 5 and 6 exclude that the right of conscientious objection 
can be exercised in an abusive manner or against the Slovak Republic’s legal order. 
Quite the contrary, the aim of these drafts is precisely to insert conscientious objection 
into the Slovak legal system to facilitate the solution of individual cases that may arrive to 
the courts and strengthen legal security in this area. 
The second factor is the natural connection of these drafts with the atmosphere of 
cooperation between States and churches that is characteristic of the European Union. 
As has been recently remarked 50, the area of law and religion is not, and must not be, an 
exception to the increasing trend to seek consensus, and voluntary coordination of 
interests, between the State and social forces. This tendency is noticeable in the high 
percentage of European Union member countries that have a system of concordatarian 
relations with the Catholic Church -and sometimes also with other religious communities- 
and in the fact that all EU members, with different nuances, have systems of non-
covenantal cooperation with institutionalized religions 51. The notion of mutual 
cooperation between State and churches applies as well to the constitutional 
environment, where areas of common interest can be identified -as obviously occurs in 
the case of freedom of conscience. For this reason, article I-52(3) of the European 
Constitution extends to churches the same rule stated by article I-47(2) when defining the 
principle of participatory democracy: the European Union “shall maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society”. With 
                                              
50 See A. HOLLERBACH, Religion et droit en dialogue: l´élément contractuel dans la coopération 
entre l’État et les communautés religieuses, in “Religion and law in dialogue: covenantal and non-
covenantal cooperation between State and religion in Europe” (ed. by R. Puza & N. Doe), Leuven 
2006, pp. 285 ff. 
51 A recent description and analysis of this European panorama can be found in the collective 
volume Religion and law in dialogue…, cited in the precedent note.  
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a difference in favor of the particular case of churches -article I-52(3) explicitly recognizes 
“their identity and their specific contribution” 52. 
A more detailed analysis of the draft agreements reveals other positive aspects of 
their text. Among them, we can mention, briefly, the following. 
Article 3(2) reserves the application of the right to conscientious objection only to 
serious cases of incompatibility between one’s own conscience and certain activity that is 
in principle obliged by law. This clarification is interesting if we consider that, according to 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the term “practice”, as utilized by article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, does not necessarily include each and every act motivated 
or influenced by a religion or belief 53. The draft agreements do not endeavor to grant civil 
effect to the entire moral doctrine of the Catholic Church and of the other registered 
churches in every aspect of life. They limit conscientious objection to cases of strict 
incompatibility between law and conscience, so that these cases can be understood as 
actual interferences with freedom of conscience, which need to be justified according to 
article 9(2) of the European Convention. 
Article 4 enumerates the types of conscientious objection included in the right 
protected by the agreements. All of them are rooted in the moral doctrine of the Catholic 
Church, but can be often found also in the doctrines of the other registered churches. 
They do not seem to raise, as such, particular problems to their acceptance. Objection to 
military service has had the support of international law and institutions for many years 54. 
Conscientious objections in the area of labor law and other employment relationships has 
a long history of protection in some countries as United States or Canada, and have been 
also endorsed by some agreements between the Italian State and religious communities 
                                              
52 This aspect has been emphasized by A. HOLLERBACH, Religion et droit en dialogue…, cited in 
note n. 50, pp. 295-296. 
53 This doctrine was repeatedly stated by the European Commission of Human Rights -when it 
existed, before Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention entered into force in November 1998- and 
later assumed by the European Court. The first decision of the European Commission in this regard 
was Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, Rep. Com. 7050/75 (in 19 “Decisions and Reports” 19-20); the 
case referred to a British pacifist sentenced to a term of imprisonment for having distributed illegal 
leaflets among English soldiers in Northern Ireland. With regard to the Court’s decisions, see Kalaç v. 
Turkey, 1 July 1997, § 27; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, § 60. 
54 For further details, see J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, La objeción de conciencia en el Derecho 
internacional, in “Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica” (1989/2), pp. 149 ff. 
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55. The same can be affirmed with regard to the area of education, which counts, in 
addition, with the support of article II-74(3) of the European Constitution 56, article 2 of the 
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 57 and some decision of the 
European Court 58. Objections in the area of healthcare, as far as they touch issues that 
are highly controversial in our societies, can not be considered, as such, unreasonable. 
For instance, experiments in the field of bio-genetics are the subject of intense and 
                                              
55 With regard to the U.S., see R. PALOMINO, Objeción de conciencia y relaciones laborales en el 
Derecho de los Estados Unidos, in “Revista Española de Derecho del Trabajo” 50 (1991), pp. 901-
930; with regard to Canada, see the essays by E. RELAÑO cited in note n. 27. The relevant 
provisions of the Italian intese or agreements are cited in note n. 48. 
56 Article II-74(3) of the European Convention provides: “The freedom to found educational 
establishments with due respect for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the 
education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and 
pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the 
exercise of such freedom and right”. 
57 Article 2 of the First Protocol provides: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the 
exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own 
religious and philosophical convictions”. 
58 Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 25 February 1982 (objection to corporal punishment in 
school). However, the doctrine of the European Court is all but clear in this point, as demonstrated 
by Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen & Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 December 1976 (objection to sex education 
in public schools), and by the more recent decisions on Islamic headscarf cases: Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, decision on the admissibility of App. No. 42393/98 (ECtHR, 15 February 2001; Leyla 
Şahin c. Turquía, 29 June 2004 (Chamber decision) and 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber 
decision). On the latter decisions, which have raised an intense scholarly debate in Europe, see S. 
CAÑAMARES ARRIBAS, Libertad religiosa, simbología y laicidad del Estado, Pamplona 2005, p. 179 
ff.; E. RELAÑO PASTOR & A. GARAY, Leyla Sahin contra Turquía y el velo islámico: la apuesta 
equivocada del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Sentencia del TEDH de 10 de noviembre 
de 2005, in “Revista Europea de Derechos Fundamentales” 6-2.º semester (2005), pp. 213-238; N. 
LERNER, How wide the margin of appreciation? The Turkish headscarf case, the Strasbourg court, 
and secularist tolerance, in “Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution” 13 
(2005), pp. 65-85; J. GUNN, Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of 
Human Rights; T. LINDHOLM, The Strasbourg Court Dealing with Turkey and the Human Right to 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Critical Assessment in the Light of Recent Case Law (Leyla Sahin 
v. Turkey, 29 June 2004); I. PLESSNER, The European Court on Human Rights between 
fundamentalist and liberal secularism; the three latter essays can be read in the Internet site 
http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers.php. 
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heated debates, among scientists and jurists as well as in public opinion, and we are far 
from reaching a universally accepted agreement on these issues. Significantly, the efforts 
to protect conscientious objection in this delicate area have not come exclusively from 
churches, as demonstrated by some initiatives promoted by left-wing political forces 59. 
And, when analyzing objection to abortion, we must not forget that -at least in Europe- the 
so-called ‘legal’ abortions are but typified situations in which voluntary abortions -
interruptions of a human life in process of development- have been decriminalized, i.e., 
exempted from the normal criminal rules that impose a punishment for these acts; this is 
probably one of the reasons why most laws decriminalizing abortion include a specific 
clause for the protection of conscientious objectors 60. 
In any event, we should not lose sight of a fundamental notion that was mentioned 
before. In Western democracies, we accept the right of conscientious objection not 
because we agree with the position of objectors, or because we think that their ideas are 
‘reasonable’, but because we understand that certain activities obliged by law imply a 
moral drama for some citizens. Therefore, we try our best to find solutions in which 
freedom of conscience can be reconciled with other legal interests in particular cases; 
and, when freedom of conscience must yield, we try to find the least restrictive 
alternatives for objectors’ moral duties 61. 
3. The draft agreements and individual positions on moral issues 
On the other hand, it is important to realize that these agreements, once they become 
part of the legal order of the Slovak Republic, will not exhaust the possibilities of 
conscientious objection of Catholics and of the faithful of the other recognized religions. It 
is natural that churches accentuate the institutional aspects of conscientious objection, 
i.e., that they look at conflicts between conscience and law from the perspective of their 
official moral doctrine -as they do in article 3 of the draft agreements. But the State’s 
                                              
59 For instance, in Spain, in 1997, the left-wing trade union Comisiones Obreras -of communist 
orientation- presented a proposal of law on “conscientious objection in scientific issues”, with the 
aim of guaranteeing objection, on moral grounds, “to participate directly in activities or interventions 
that include a research or pharmacological action on living beings”, as well as objection to perform 
“experiments in the area of biotechnology or genetic engineering”. The right to conscientious 
objection would be granted to physicians, researchers, nurses or medical assistants, technicians 
and students.  
60 See R. NAVARRO-VALLS, La objeción de conciencia al aborto…, cit. in note n. 35, pp. 257 ff. 
61 See supra, notes n. 27 to n. 30 and corresponding text.  
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perspective has to be different, and can not consider, for instance, that Catholics’ 
conscientious objection would be justified only when it is endorsed by the official doctrine 
of the Church 62. Conscientious objection is a consequence of the exercise of an 
individual right. For the State’s legal order, the conscience of each citizen has a value in 
itself and not because it is consistent with the dictates of the Catholic Church or of any 
other religious denomination. The endorsement of a clear institutional doctrine in certain 
moral questions can serve as proof of the sincerity or of the coherence of the alleged 
conscientious objection, but it does not make this objection more worthy of protection. 
It useful to draw attention to this point, for general moral rules can be adapted by the 
individual conscience in particular cases in diverse ways. Thus, a Catholic could consider 
himself freed from some generally binding moral rules in order to avoid conflict with a civil 
legal obligation. But the opposite could also occur, i.e. that individual conscience detects 
an inevitable conflict of duties -moral obligation versus civil legal obligation- where official 
Catholic rules are perhaps more flexible. This is not a mere hypothesis. In the United 
States, one of the significant cases decided by the Supreme Court on objection to military 
service had a practicing Catholic as protagonist 63, and it is well known that the Catholic 
Church does not have an institutional opposition to the existence of the army or of 
compulsory military service. 
When there is a discrepancy between individual conscience and ‘institutional 
conscience’, the State’s law must recognize that the former is prevailing, even when the 
individual’s position is clearly divergent from the official doctrine of his church. 
Heterodoxy can be argued in the inside of a church’s organization, but in the realm of the 
State’s legal system the position adopted by the individual in the exercise of a 
fundamental right is what actually counts. This does not make superfluous that the State 
law explicitly recognizes conscientious objections grounded on the formal moral rules of 
some churches -as the draft agreements of the Slovak Republic do. This sort of 
recognition is useful to facilitate the allegation and proof of conscientious objections on 
the part of those individuals that are in the situations described by the law. 
                                              
62 See J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Las objeciones de conciencia de los católicos, in “Cuestiones vivas 
de Derecho matrimonial, procesal y penal canónico. Instituciones canónicas en el marco de la 
libertad religiosa” (ed. by R. Rodríguez Chacón & L. Ruano Espina), Salamanca 2005, pp. 335 ff. 
63 The decision was Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), in which the Supreme Court 
also decided the twin case Negre v. Larsen (Negre was the Catholic). For a comment to this 
decision in the Spanish legal literature, see J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, La objeción de conciencia en la 
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo norteamericano, cited in note n. 32, pp. 415-417; and R. 
PALOMINO, Las objeciones de conciencia, cit. in note n. 14, pp. 74 ff. 
 24
 
 
 
“Protecting conscientious objection as a fundamental right…”, iustel.com, RGDCDEE, n.º 12, octubre 2006 
IV. THE SURPRISING APPROACH OF THE OPINION WRITTEN BY THE E.U. 
NETWORK OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
We are fully aware that the ideas we have expressed in the foregoing paragraphs are 
in sharp contrast with a substantial part of the Opinion n.º 4-2005 written by the E.U. 
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (14 December 2005) 64 with 
specific regard to the draft agreement with the Holy See -although a large part of its 
content is applicable also to the draft agreement with the other registered churches in 
Slovakia, as the opinion itself acknowledges. The text of the Opinion is too complex to be 
commented in detail within the limited space of this paper, but we can not refrain from 
making some brief observations to conclude our contribution to this volume. 
The most striking characteristic of the Opinion is, perhaps, its surprising approach to 
the analysis of the draft agreement. As we have noted previously, the first impression that 
the reader immediately obtains from the text is that the Opinion is mainly concerned 
about guaranteeing an alleged right to abortion and homosexual rights -including the 
supposed right to marriage between persons of the same sex- rather than about 
guaranteeing the right to conscientious conscience, which seems to be observed with 
diffidence. This is shocking, for conscientious objection is an expression of a fundamental 
right -freedom of thought, conscience and religion- enshrined by most European 
constitutions and the most relevant international law instruments, while we can not find in 
Europe a fundamental right to abortion or to celebrate a homosexual marriage recognized 
neither at constitutional nor at international level 65. 
The Opinion puts a special emphasis on the potential conflicts between the 
conscientious objection of Catholics and the alleged women’s right to abortion. This is 
particularly astonishing considering two factors. 
First, we must not forget that the so-called ‘legal abortions’ are specific situations in 
which the State law has decriminalized an action that would be otherwise criminally 
prosecutable 66. Properly there is no right to abortion or, even less, a fundamental right to 
abortion. Strictly speaking, voluntary abortion is, so to say, ‘against the stream’ of 
                                              
64 For the sources to find this text, see note n. 49.  
65 The Opinion explicitly recognizes it (p. 19). 
66 This is applicable, at least, to European legal systems. See, in the context of a comparison 
between European and U.S. approaches, M.A. GLENDON, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law. 
American Failures, European Challenges, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987 (some social tendencies 
may have changed since the time of this essay, but the legal framework continues to be essentially the 
same in Europe). 
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constitutional rights, for it constitutes a tolerated exception to the general rule that 
protects the right to life. On the contrary, conscientious objection to abortion are ‘in favor 
of the stream’ of constitutional rights, for it tends to ensure the protection of the right to 
life and of the right to freedom of conscience 67. 
In the second place, the Network insists on the possible conflicts with therapeutic 
abortion, underlining the significance of adequately guaranteeing the woman’s right to 
life. But it seems to ignore that article 6(2) of the agreements specifically provides that 
“the exercise of conscientious objection must not endanger human life or human health”. 
And it apparently ignores also that we are not dealing with an underdeveloped country 
with poor conditions of public health or with a country in state of war, in which we may 
presume a frequent or even massive situation of women’s rape. The draft agreements 
refer to Slovakia, a member country of the European Union with a considerable degree of 
economic and social development. And, in the European Union context, the reason most 
often invoked by women to require the performance of a legal abortion is, by far, the 
‘danger to the mental health of the mother’ 68. It is well-known that this means, in practice, 
a way to seek free abortion beyond the legal limits when a woman, for lack of prudence, 
becomes pregnant against her desire. This broadly consented legal fraud may receive 
different judgments according to the position of the observer -some will think that to 
overtly permit a massive legal fraud is not a wise policy, above all in matters so closely 
related to human rights; some others, instead, will judge it as a positive phenomenon, as 
far as it would be a sort of legitimate ‘alternative use of law’ in the context of the fight for 
women’s liberation. In any event, in view of the European actual panorama of legalized 
abortions, the fact that the Network repeatedly mentions some isolated border cases -
pitiful cases- of therapeutic abortion to make an argument in favor of the right to abortion 
against freedom of conscience looks somewhat an interested mystification of reality 69. 
                                              
67 See R. NAVARRO-VALLS, La objeción de conciencia al aborto…, cited in note n. 35, pp. 259-269. 
68 In Spain, according to the official data provided by the Health Ministry, in 96.7% of voluntary 
abortions performed in 2004 the alleged legal ground was the mother’s health (it is well known that 
cases involving risk for the physical health of the mother are hardly over 1%). Significantly, in the 
same year 96,4 of abortions were performed in public centers (of which only 10% were hospitals). 
See the Internet pages of the Ministry in: 
http://www.msc.es/profesionales/saludPublica/prevPromocion/embarazo/tablas_figuras.htm. 
69 Significantly, the Network mentions a number of actions taken in the context of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, but scarcely some of them refers to a country in economic and social conditions 
comparable to the Slovak Republic or any other European Union member (they mention, e.g., 
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From this perspective, the European Network’s Opinion seems to be, in its approach 
as well as in its final conclusions, more in the line of political activism supporting a right to 
free abortion than in the strict realm of legal opinions grounded on current European and 
international law. It is significant, for instance, its continuous reference to abortion as 
“medical services” in the context of healthcare activities. Or the fact that it indicates that 
the Network benefited from the contributions provided, upon request, by certain non-
governmental organizations, without further specifications 70; but in the text only NGOs 
working in favor of ‘reproductive rights’ are actually mentioned, and the Opinion’s only 
appendix -in addition to the text of the draft agreement with the Holy See- is a written 
comment by the Center for Reproductive Rights with regard to a pending -and extreme- 
case before the European Court of Human Rights 71. Naturally, we do not have anything 
against political activism, which is perfectly legitimate if it uses legitimate means, but one 
could expect a very different approach from a network of experts on fundamental rights, 
which is supposed to provide a legal opinion on such a relevant issue as the first 
experience of a covenantal State instrument exclusively focused on the guarantee of a 
fundamental right as freedom of conscience. 
The Opinion also reveals some other important deficiencies from a strict legal 
viewpoint. In addition to the singularity of its approach to the potential conflicts between 
conscientious objection and voluntary sought abortion, the Opinion seems to adopt a 
fairly restrictive view of freedom of conscience’s scope of protection -in overt contrast with 
the General Comment on article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, paradoxically cited by the Opinion in different occasions as an authoritative 
source 72. The Opinion virtually ignores the intense scholarly and judicial debate on this 
controversial issue -which includes many critic views of some decisions of the Court of 
Strasbourg- as well as the vast legal literature existing in Europe 73. In our view, the 
logical attitude would have been, rather, to acknowledge the interest of an initiative aimed 
                                                                                                                            
Guatemala, Bolivia, Perú, Panamá, Mongolia, Tibet, Morocco, Nepal, Sri Lanka, etc.; see pp. 19-20 
of the Opinion). The Opinion mentions only a case that could be applicable to Slovakia -a extreme 
case in Poland, which is pending before the European Court of Human Rights. 
70 See Opinion, p. 4. 
71 See Opinion, pp. 36-41. 
72 See especially n. 4 of the General Comment. 
73 It is astonishing that one of the very few scholarly sources cited by the opinion is a book written 
in Finnish in 1988, whose main source in this regard is an unpublished licenciate thesis written, in 
1987, by one of the acting members of the Network (see note 28 of the Opinion). 
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at the protection of a human right, to identify its positive aspects and its potential 
usefulness in the European context -in which freedom of religion or belief tends to 
generate heated controversies and is not as well guaranteed as one may think at first 
glance-, and then to analyze whether it entails serious threats to other human rights or 
public legal interests and, if appropriate, to seek which prudential measures should be 
taken to prevent unnecessary or harmful conflicts of rights. 
Two final comments on what, in our judgment, constitute other flaws of the European 
Network’s Opinion on the draft agreement between Slovakia and the Holy See. 
On the one hand, the Opinion seems to focus on the supposed privileges that the 
agreement would confer to the Catholic Church. It thus loses sight of a basic fact: that the 
purpose of the agreement is not to protect the rights of the major church in Slovakia but 
to better guarantee the freedom of conscience of Catholics; and the same can be 
affirmed with regard to the draft agreement with the other registered churches. Citizens, 
not churches, are the center of attention of the agreements, for freedom of conscience is 
an individual right. To protect this right constitutes a common interest of the Slovak State 
and of the churches -although they consider it from different perspectives- and for this 
reason they find it appropriate to create a specific covenantal legal instrument to that 
purpose. 
On the other hand, it is inaccurate to affirm that the legal approval of these 
agreements on conscientious objections will grant a privileged position to the Catholic 
Church over the other registered churches -for the agreement with them would not be 
considered an international treaty- and, even more, over the rest of religious faiths in 
Slovakia 74. This, plainly, does not make sense at all. As we have repeatedly affirmed, 
freedom of conscience is an individual right. All conscientious objections by all citizens -
believers or non-believers- deserve the same degree of protection. Nobody could 
seriously maintain that ‘Catholic’ or, more generally, ‘religious’ conscientious objections 
have a primacy over ‘atheistic’ or ‘agnostic’ conscientious objections. But the aim of the 
agreements is not to create a ‘privileged class’ of conscientious objection, or to 
‘institutionalize’ it -i.e. to transfer it to the hands of the churches. Their goal is to facilitate 
the exercise of freedom of conscience for a vast majority of citizens, especially by making 
easier the proof of the sincerity and the consistence of the moral ideas expressed by 
objectors 75. It seems logical, and fully legitimate, to enact a law to facilitate the exercise 
                                              
74 See Opinion, pp. 6 & 31-32. 
75 We must remember that the European Court of Human Rights has emphasized that the ethical 
ideas -religious or non-religious- protected by article 9 of the European Convention are those which 
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of a fundamental right for a large amount of citizens when it is possible to identify a 
substantial number of potentially similar situations. This is perfectly compatible with the 
principle of equality and with the individual character of freedom of conscience. If we 
accepted the curious reasoning of the Network of Experts, we should also declare 
discriminatory all the Christian chaplaincies existing in the armies, penitentiaries or 
hospitals of many European countries -including the France governed by the 
constitutional principle of laïcité- for the fact that they make easier the exercise of 
religious freedom for faithful of the major religions in comparison with non-believers or 
with the faithful of minority religions. 
In addition to its lack of logic, the argument of the Opinion with respect to the principle 
of equality is utterly unrealistic. Experience demonstrates that -at least in Europe- specific 
guarantees created to facilitate the freedom of religion and conscience of members of 
major religions not only have not impaired the legal situation of other religions but, on the 
contrary, have helped an improvement of their position. For instance, in Italy or in Spain, 
the existence of a concordat between the State and the Catholic Church has ended up 
ameliorating the legal status of the rest of religious denominations, sometimes through 
covenantal legal instruments -intese in Italy, acuerdos de cooperación in Spain- and 
sometimes through unilateral State laws 76. 
                                                                                                                            
denote “views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance” 
(Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 25 February 1982. § 36). 
76 See, in more detail, J. MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, Religious Freedom and Democratic Change in Spain, 
in “Brigham Young University Law Review” (2006), forthcoming.  
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